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LECTURE

GLORIOUS REVOLUTION TO AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH ORIGIN OF THE
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain*
INTRODUCTION
Good evening. It is a great honor and a high privilege to be delivering
the Clynes Lecture and to be a part of the University of Notre Dame’s
London Law at 50 Speaker Series. I want specially to thank Professor
Michael Addo, the director of this wonderful Law Centre, for his extraordinary hospitality to Maura and me, and to thank Dean Nell Newton and Professor A.J. Bellia—I am proud to say a former law clerk of mine—for
extending the invitation to speak here tonight.1
I
A
One provision of the U.S. Constitution has been much in the news lately:
the Second Amendment, which protects the right to keep and to bear arms.
Due to several recent tragic school shootings, most recently in Parkland, Florida, a debate has been raging in the United States about the proper regulation of firearms. Proposals abound for wider background checks,
© 2019 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit. Lecture delivered on April 18,
2018, at the University of Notre Dame–London Law Centre, 1 Suffolk Street, London,
United Kingdom.
1 The views expressed herein are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I wish to
acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Benjamin Field, my law clerk, in preparing
these remarks.
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registration and permitting requirements, and limitations on the types of
weapons that can be privately owned or sold. Meanwhile, courts across the
country have been routinely asked in the past several years to evaluate
whether existing legal restrictions are consistent with the constitutional right.
The tension between the Constitution and the budding restrictionist zeitgeist
has even led one distinguished jurist—retired Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens—to urge just three weeks ago, in the pages of the New York
Times, that gun control proponents “should demand a repeal of the Second
Amendment.”2 The call to amend the American Constitution was sufficiently
significant that it received considerable news coverage from major outlets
throughout the United Kingdom.3
It is definitively not my intention today to wade into such debates about
the wisdom of the Second Amendment or to deal with pending or recent
court interpretations. Rather, I want to explore how it came to be and what
role British history had in its genesis. For Americans like myself, such history
helps us to understand the meaning of our own Constitution. For the
Britons here, it is a powerful example of how your own constitutional principles4 shaped the legal landscape of far-flung countries once within the Brit2 John Paul Stevens, Opinion, Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-secondamendment.html.
The Second Amendment is not alone in Justice Stevens’ crosshairs. He has also suggested curtailing the First Amendment to permit greater regulation of spending on political speech. See Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for ‘Giant Step in the Wrong
Direction,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/us/politics/
justice-stevenss-prescription-for-giant-step-in-wrong-direction.html. The First Amendment
has also been threatened by violence on state university campuses to shut down unpopular
speech, see, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Protestors Disrupt Speech by ‘Bell Curve’ Author at Vermont
College, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/middleburycollege-charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html?_r=0&module=inline, and the religious liberties guaranteed by that Amendment have been the subject of extensive litigation in the
last several years, see, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). All
that is just to say that the Second Amendment is not the only constitutional rights provision
under challenge today.
3 For examples across the political spectrum, see Harriet Alexander, Retired Supreme
Court Judge Calls for Repeal of Second Amendment, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 27, 2018), https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/27/retired-supreme-court-judge-calls-repeal-secondamendment/; Boer Deng, Judge John Paul Stevens Calls for an End to Americans’ Right to Bear
Arms, TIMES (London) (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/judge-johnpaul-stevens-calls-for-an-end-to-americans-right-to-bear-arms-cvkzz809z; and Tom McCarthy, Gun Safety Groups Not Convinced by Retired Justice’s Call to Repeal Second Amendment,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/mar/27/john-paulstevens-former-supreme-court-justice-repeal-second-amendment.
4 As the United Kingdom famously does not have a codified Constitution, when I
refer to the British or English Constitution, I mean that set of fundamental laws and norms
that are generally understood to be the foundation of British government. See Robert
Blackburn, Britain’s Unwritten Constitution, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/
magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-constitution (“Britain does not have a codified
constitution but an unwritten one formed of Acts of Parliament, court judgments and con-
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ish Empire. And for those simply interested in law as a discipline,
irrespective of geography, I hope this lecture serves as a useful case study of
how distant history can help contemporary lawyers interpret the meaning of
a legal text adopted over 225 years ago.
B
As I have suggested, the precise contours of the Second Amendment
right are unsettled, and many cases seeking to define it either are before my
court now or are likely to come before it and other federal courts. So, everything I say should be taken simply as a description of history by an American
judge, not as an opinion on, or prediction of, the future evolution of American law in this area. The only definitive legal conclusions I will offer are
those already settled by the Supreme Court of the United States.
II
Before getting into the history, one might ask: Does medieval and early
modern English history really matter? In my role as a federal appellate court
judge, I can safely say that, for me, the answer is yes, because our Supreme
Court has said so. In the landmark 2008 case District of Columbia v. Heller, the
Supreme Court was asked to decide for the first time whether the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and to bear arms, as
opposed to a right to use arms as part of an organized militia. Invoking both
“text and history,” the Court said that it did.5 The Court explained that such
meaning was “strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second
Amendment,”6 and a key part of the “historical background” surveyed by the
Court was indeed English history.7
A
The necessity of turning to history flows from a tension between two
foundational Anglo-American principles: on the one hand, unalienable
rights; and on the other, democratic self-governance. Like all constitutional
ventions.”). Because it is informal, the British Constitution lacks the kind of
supermajoritarian force of the U.S. Constitution, a concern that motivated the ratification
of the American Bill of Rights. See David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s
Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 244 (2008) (James Madison “described the
arms rights amendment as remedying two crucial defects in the English Declaration of
Right: that the right included only the Protestant population, and that the right was, as a
statutory enactment, efficacious against the King, but not against the actions of later
Parliaments.”).
5 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
6 Id. at 592.
7 Id. at 592–95. Justice Thomas’s concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago also considered the English history of the right in justifying applying it against the States. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 815–16 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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rights, the Second Amendment protects an individual’s liberty at the expense
of limiting the range of policy choices available to the polity. If the Second
Amendment right is arbitrarily confined, individual liberty is lost; if the right
is capriciously expanded, democratic self-governance on questions of public
safety is nullified. To know the correct balance, we judges must apply neutral
principles of legal interpretation to give fixed meaning to the democratically
enacted constitutional provision, based on the popular understanding of
those who adopted it.
B
Which begs an obvious question: What did the ratifying popular majorities in the year 1791 mean when they adopted the Second Amendment to
limit the powers of the newly established government?
One thing we do know is that they chose a somewhat inscrutable text. It
reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”8 The
meaning of the unique prefatory clause discussing the militia has famously
been the subject of much debate, but tonight we focus on the first ten words
of the operative clause. What did the ratifying public understand to be the
meaning of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”?
It is in answering this question that the English historical experience
really does matter because the newly independent Americans understood
their rights against the backdrop of the English legal tradition.9 As the
Supreme Court put it a century later, “the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay
down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors.”10
8 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
9 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in his review of America, the country was deeply
influenced by its roots across the Atlantic. As he explained it, “there is not an opinion, not
a habit, not a law, I could say not an event, that the point of departure does not easily
explain.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 49 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T.
Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2010) (1835), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/tocquevilledemocracy-in-america-historical-critical-edition-vol-1.
Indeed, at the time of the Declaration of Independence, most of the newly independent states adopted the English common law, as modified by future legislative enactments.
See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 404 (2009); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591, 658–59 (1834) (“It is insisted, that our ancestors, when they migrated to this
country, brought with them the English common law, as a part of their heritage. That this
was the case, to a limited extent, is admitted. No one will contend, that the common law,
as it existed in England, has ever been in force in all its provisions, in any state in this
union. It was adopted, so far only as its principles were suited to the condition of the
colonies . . . .”).
10 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897). A generation after that, the
Supreme Court elaborated that “[t]he language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted
safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when
the instrument was framed and adopted.” Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–09 (1925).
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So, let us turn to the relevant English history to explore what light it
sheds on the American right to keep and to bear arms.11
III
To begin, it is worth noting that a right to have arms is not among the
most ancient in the English tradition.12 For instance, Magna Carta enshrines
the principle of due process of law before a person can be deprived of liberty
or property, but nowhere does it mention a right to have arms.13
Rather, the story of the rise of the English right to have arms begins in
earnest during the English Civil War of the 1640s between King Charles I and
Parliament. The immediate spark for the war was a clash over who would
control the militia, leading both sides to scramble for possession of as many
arms as possible.14 Once the parliamentary forces had triumphed, the Interregnum government moved to reorganize and to repurpose the militia.15 A
new Militia Act transformed the militia from its traditional role of keeping
the peace and suppressing insurrection into a politicized force to disarm
Catholics, Cavaliers (the royalist supporters of Charles I), and other
dissenters.16
When fortunes changed again and Charles II became king, the Restoration government passed yet another Militia Act, which made clear that the
king had sole command of the militia, and which formalized broad discretion for officers to search for and to seize weapons from any person “dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom.”17 At the same time, a series of
proclamations declared that, at least formally, all who had fought for Parliament in the English Civil War were prohibited from carrying firearms.18
So, between the reigns of Charles I and Charles II, the use of the militia
and selective arming and disarming of English subjects had become a key
part of the factional disputes that roiled Britain in the middle of the seventeenth century.
11 For linguistic consistency, I will refer to the American right to “keep and to bear”
arms and the English right to “have” arms, with the verbs drawn from the relevant provisions of the American and English Bills of Rights, respectively.
12 For a review of the way the novel right to have arms came to be treated as ancient in
the English Bill of Rights, see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 121–34 (1994).
13 See English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. ¶ 39 (July 28, 2014), https://
www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation (“No free man shall be
seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or
deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send
others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”).
14 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 19–20.
15 See id. at 24.
16 See id. at 23–24.
17 Militia Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13 (1662); see MALCOLM, supra note 12, at
50.
18 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 49–50.
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IV
The stage was set, then, for weapons holding to be a central component
of the final great clash between the Crown and Parliament, which ultimately
led to a codified English right to have arms.
A
1
The next major step in this process after the Restoration-era Militia Act
was the Game Act of 1671. In many respects, it mirrored prior game acts that
prohibited the use of certain weapons for hunting in order to reserve hunting as a sport for the nobility and gentry.19 But for the first time, guns were
included in the list of per se prohibited devices.20 And a gamekeeper could
unilaterally search suspects’ premises for prohibited arms, as could any other
person authorized by a warrant from a single justice of the peace.21 Moreover, the property and wealth requirements for hunting were raised to be fifty
times the level required to vote.22
At least on paper, then, for the first time, the vast majority of Englishmen were formally prohibited from having guns.23 Yet, despite the Game
Act’s sweeping provisions, it was unevenly enforced,24 and it may not have
become a cause for concern but for a series of political crises that beset
England in the 1670s and 1680s and saw both it and the Militia Act used for
ulterior purposes.
2
Those crises began in earnest in 1678 with a widespread anti-Catholic
hysteria inspired by a supposed conspiracy known as the Popish Plot.25 In
response, Charles II issued a proclamation temporarily disarming all English
Catholics.26
That episode was followed quickly by the Exclusion Crisis between the
Crown and Parliament, centered around Charles’s brother James. James’s
conversion to Catholicism had been exposed in 1673, having refused to
affirm his allegiance to the Church of England when Parliament passed the
19 See id. at 69–70.
20 See id. at 72.
21 See id. at 71.
22 See id.
23 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 136 (1999) (“In 1671 Parliament for the first time enacted a statute that deprived almost all Englishmen of the right to
have arms. The new measure was a game act that so steeply raised the property qualifications on the right to hunt that possession of firearms became illegal except for the wealthy
few.”).
24 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 86–91.
25 See id. at 92.
26 See id.
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Test Act requiring such an oath for all public officials.27 In the wake of the
Popish Plot scare, Parliament sought to exclude James from the throne, leading Charles II to dissolve three successive parliaments between 1679 and
1681.28 As part of the exclusion debate, some Members of Parliament (MPs)
sought to arm Protestants as protection against royally backed Catholicism.29
Two years later, in 1683, a plot among Protestant conspirators to murder
the king was exposed and came to be known as the Rye House Plot.30 In
response, the Crown disarmed notable opposition Protestants, and Charles
jumped at the opportunity to use the Rye House Plot as a basis to prosecute
many of the supporters of exclusion and to purge them from the militia.31
3
The sectarian tensions under Charles II paled, however, in comparison
to what followed when he died in 1685 without a legitimate heir, thereby
leaving the throne to the Catholic James.32
The new King James II went even further than his late brother to favor
Catholics and to disarm Protestants.33 He started in Ireland, where he disarmed the heavily Protestant militia in northern Ireland and replaced Protestant officers and soldiers in the Irish army with Catholics.34 In England,
James quashed a revolt intended to place on the throne a Presbyterian illegitimate son of Charles II, and James then replaced large numbers of officers in
the militia and army with Catholics, in open violation of the Test Act.35 At
the same time, James attempted to make expansive use of the Game Act and
a medieval statute to disarm political dissidents.36
Tensions came to a head in 1687 when James suspended the Test Act
without approval of Parliament and used his lords lieutenant to pressure
subordinate officers to support repeal of the Test Act in Parliament.37 When
James announced the birth of a son—thereby assuring a Catholic heir—it
was the last straw for his Protestant opponents, who began entreating the
Protestant Prince William of Orange—husband to James’s Protestant daughter Mary—to cross the sea and to overthrow James.38 William landed in
27 See id. at 94–95.
28 See id.
29 See Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 27, 36 (2000).
30 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 92.
31 See id. at 95.
32 See id. at 93.
33 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–93 (2008) (“Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings Charles II and James II succeeded in
using select militias loyal to them to suppress political dissidents, in part by disarming their
opponents.”).
34 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 96–98.
35 See id. at 98–102.
36 See id. at 102–06.
37 See id. at 107–09.
38 See id. at 110.
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England in November 1688, and just a month later, James had fled to
France.39 This rapid and nearly bloodless coup set off what would become
known as the Glorious Revolution.40 James did lead a subsequent invasion of
Ireland, but he was defeated for good by William at the Battle of the Boyne in
July 1690.41
B
Since only a reigning monarch could convene a regular Parliament, William called a Convention Parliament to recognize James’s removal and, presumably, to invite William and Mary to become the new king and queen.42
But mindful of the Stuart pretensions to absolutism that had sparked the
Glorious Revolution, the Convention formed committees to draft a Declaration of Rights that a new king must respect—committees that were dominated by Whigs, the political faction favoring parliamentary supremacy and
who had sought to exclude James from the throne.43
After several amendments from within the House of Commons and further amendments from the Tory-dominated Lords,44 the Convention Parliament agreed to a declaration, which both listed a series of grievances against
James II and enumerated thirteen “ancient rights and liberties” that William
was expected to honor.45 On the grievances side, James II was alleged to
have “endeavour[ed] to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the
laws and liberties of this kingdom” by “causing several good subjects being
Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed
and employed contrary to law.”46 The Convention articulated a corresponding right: “That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their
defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law . . . .”47
39 See id. at 111–12.
40 See id. at 112.
41 James invaded Ireland in March 1689 with a French army—supported by a simultaneous revolt by Scottish Highlanders—but the Jacobite armies were defeated by William’s
forces at the Battle of the Boyne in Ireland and the Battle of Dunkeld in Scotland. See Civil
War and Revolution, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/timeline/
civilwars_timeline_noflash.shtml (last visited Sep. 1, 2019). Jacobite revolts in favor of the
Stuarts continued into the middle of the eighteenth century but were never successful. See
Empire and Sea Power, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/timeline/empiresea
power_timeline_noflash.shtml (last visited Sep. 1, 2019).
42 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 113–14.
43 See id. at 114–15.
44 For two detailed descriptions of the drafting history—which come to different conclusions about that history’s influence on contemporary interpretations of the Second
Amendment—see MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 115–21; and Schwoerer, supra note 29, at
37–43.
45 See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the
Crown, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
46 Id.
47 Id.
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William accepted the declaration, and, when a properly convened Parliament was seated in 1689, it was codified in what we now know as the English
Bill of Rights.48
C
I should pause here to make clear to the audience that I well recognize
the irony of giving a speech on a right created in no small part to allow
Protestant Englishmen to oppress their Catholic countrymen, here at a Catholic university a short walk from Whitehall, Westminster, and Buckingham
Palace. Hopefully, since no agents of the Queen’s lord lieutenant appear to
be breaking down the doors, we can be confident that whatever force the
arms provision of the Bill of Rights still has, its sectarian motivation is no
longer British government policy.
V
Returning to the historical narrative, as of 1689, the right to have arms
was declared one of the core rights of Englishmen, although it was a version
with limitations based on creed, social condition, and the laws of Parliament.
Let us now consider how that right evolved in England between 1689 and
1776, when the colonies declared their independence and the American
Revolution was underway.
A
In the immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, a broad right to
have arms did not seem to be in the offing, as William and his Tory supporters in Parliament blocked efforts to liberalize the Militia and Game Acts.
Although Parliament attempted several times to pass a new militia act,
those efforts foundered against the king’s opposition to relinquishing royal
control of the militia, and the Restoration-era, Crown-friendly Militia Act of
1662 remained in force.49 In fact, during debate on a new militia act, some
MPs who had been vociferous opponents of the king’s use of the militia to
search for and to seize weapons from Protestants supported the use of that
power by Protestant officials to disarm Catholics.50 Use of the Militia Act to
disarm dangerous and disaffected persons continued unabated.51 In fact, in
1701, William offered monetary rewards for such disarming, and Parliament
thanked him for “order[ing] the seizing of all horses and arms of Papists, and
48 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008) (citing 1 W. & M., c. 2,
§ 7, 3 STAT. AT LARGE 441).
49 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 113–24; Schwoerer, supra note 29, at 49.
50 Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22 & n.59, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
51 Id. at 22.
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other disaffected persons.”52 The Militia Act provisions allowing search and
seizure of weapons from disaffected persons remained in effect until 1757.53
As for the Game Act, new versions in 1693 and 1706 did omit guns from
the list of per se prohibited weapons.54 But otherwise the game laws were
still enforced as they had been against social classes below the gentry, while a
Whig-backed proposed amendment to permit every Protestant to keep a musket in his house was defeated in Parliament.55
B
Over the century following the Glorious Revolution, however, a Whiginflected view of the right to have arms gained popular and legal purchase.
As a matter of positive law, courts and officials became reluctant to read
statutes governing arms to sweep too broadly.
Courts interpreted the Game Act to be consistent with a right for Protestants to have guns. A 1704 county court decision permitted officials to
enforce the Game Act but cautioned them that “none of her Majestie’s Protestant subjects were to be . . . ‘disturbed in keeping arms for their own preservation.’”56 A trio of cases before the Courts of Common Pleas and Kings
Bench from 1738 to 1752 confirmed that the Game Act was not to be read to
disarm the people, for it was “not to be imagined, that it was the Intention of
the Legislature . . . to disarm all the People of England.”57
Meanwhile, other statutes restricting the use of arms fell into desuetude
in the decades following the Glorious Revolution.58 For example, a statute
enacted under Henry VIII in 1541 restricting ownership of handguns was not
used in a single prosecution after 1693.59
By the mid-eighteenth century, a philosophical view had become popular drawn from the Whig position that to have arms was a natural right. In
52 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 1236 (London, T.C. Hansard 1809)).
53 See id. at 22 n.59.
54 See Schwoerer, supra note 29, at 50–52.
55 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 126–28.
56 MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 127 (emphasis omitted) (quoting A.H.A. HAMILTON,
QUARTER SESSIONS FROM QUEEN ELIZABETH TO QUEEN ANNE 269 (London, Sampson Low,
Marston, Searle & Rivington 1878)).
57 See id. at 129 (quoting Wingfield v. Stratford (1752) 96 Eng. Rep. 787, 787–88
(K.B.), reprinted in JOSEPH SAYER, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S
BENCH BEGINNING MICHAELMAS TERM, 25 GEO. 2, ENDING TRINITY TERM, 29 & 30 GEO. 2, at
15, 15–17 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1775)); Brief of the Cato Inst. & History
Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter Cato Heller Brief]. The
other two cases referred to are King v. Gardiner (1738), 93 Eng. Rep. 1056 (K.B.), and
Mallock v. Eastly (1744), 87 Eng. Rep. 1370 (C.P.). Cato Heller Brief, supra, at 7.
58 See Cato Heller Brief, supra note 57, at 7–8.
59 See id. at 8 (citing 33 Hen. VIII, c. 6, §§ 1–2 (1541)).
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his canonical Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone60
described a set of “absolute rights of individuals,” which “would belong to
their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is intitled to
enjoy whether out of society or in it.”61 As he explained it, “the principal aim
of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights,
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature.”62 Blackstone’s
view of the nature of rights and of civil society reflects the social contractarian view of John Locke, who posited that men naturally begin in a
“state of perfect freedom . . . within the bounds of the law of nature”63 and
are only “willing to quit [that] condition . . . for the mutual preservation of
their lives, liberties and estates.”64
Blackstone distilled man’s natural rights into what he called “three principal or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty; and the right of private property.”65 Expanding on the right to personal security, Blackstone explained that it “consists in a person’s legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life,” which was itself “the immediate gift of
God, a right inherent by nature in every individual.”66
Blackstone, writing in the 1760s, opined that English law protected more
than the core Lockean rights of life, liberty, and property. As he explained,
“in vain would these rights be declared . . . if the constitution had provided
no other method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject . . . .”67 The
people’s auxiliary rights, which Blackstone derived from the Bill of Rights,
included “that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition
and degree, and such as are allowed by law.”68 Blackstone explained such
right as “a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of
resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are
found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.”69
60 Blackstone lived from 1723 to 1780. Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone and Biography, in
BLACKSTONE AND HIS COMMENTARIES 1, 45 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 2009). The first edition of the
Commentaries was published in 1765. Id. at 1.
61 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *119 (emphasis omitted).
62 Id. at *120.
63 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(1690) (emphasis omitted).
64 Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted).
65 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 61, at *125.
66 Id.
67 Id. at *136.
68 Id. at *139.
69 Id. Further evidence suggests Blackstone was not alone in his views. For instance,
when anti-Catholic riots broke out in London in 1780, the Recorder of London—the city’s
legal advisor—issued an opinion confirming the right of individuals and private associations to have arms. See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 133–34. As he explained it, “[t]he right
of his majesty’s Protestant subjects, to have arms for their own defence, and to use them for
lawful purposes, is most clear and undeniable.” Id. at 134 (quoting Letter from the
Recorder of London (July 24, 1780), reprinted in WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS
ON POLICE 59–60 (London, Baker & Galabin 1785); Cato Heller Brief, supra note 57, at 10
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It should not be surprising that Blackstone’s view of the right crossed the
Atlantic to the American colonies, since, as our Supreme Court recently
observed, his “works constituted the preeminent authority on English law for
the founding generation.”70 Whether by transmission of the common law or
Whig political philosophy, the right to have arms was important to Americans
on the brink of the Revolutionary War. The immediate spark for war was
British attempts in April 1775 to seize American arms and munitions stores in
Lexington, Massachusetts, and Williamsburg, Virginia.71 That July, the Continental Congress adopted a Declaration of Causes and Necessity of Taking
Up Arms, which listed among its complaints the British army’s dispossession
of Boston citizens’ arms.72
A year later, the Declaration of Independence famously followed the natural-rights principles of Locke and Blackstone by declaring that “all men . . .
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” and asserting
a popular right to revolt against a despotic government that failed to safeguard those rights.73 Many of the wartime state legislatures adopted provisions protecting the rights of citizens and militiamen to have arms, such as
the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, which stated that “the people
have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”74
After the war, when the U.S. Constitution was being ratified, James
Madison sought to allay fears of a despotic federal government by pointing
out that such a government “would be opposed [by] a militia amounting to
near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,” recognizing that
citizens had “the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess
over the people of almost every other nation.”75 And thus, the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was adopted as part of our Bill of Rights
in 1791.
VII
So how has the right to have arms, or to keep and to bear arms, evolved
ever since?
(same). For a view that the Recorder’s opinion ultimately did not prevail, see Schwoerer,
supra note 29, at 53–55. For additional English authorities asserting a broad right to have
arms around the time of the American Revolution, see LEVY, supra note 23, at 137–39.
70 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
71 See LEVY, supra note 23, at 141.
72 See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Original Understanding of the Second Amendment, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 117, 120 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
73 Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.
gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript (last updated July 26, 2019).
74 Halbrook, supra note 72, at 120–21 (quoting PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII); see also
MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 146–50.
75 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 233 (James Madison) (Jim Miller ed., 2014).
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In the United Kingdom, the answer is that the right has been dramatically diminished. With the exception of a brief period of confiscation in
response to social tensions in the early nineteenth century, the British right
to have arms remained intact until the twentieth century.76 But after World
War I, Parliament enacted a sweeping gun control law imposing a licensure
regime with significant discretion given to government officials to deny
licenses.77
Over time, the restrictions became tighter and license fees more onerous, so that gun possession fell substantially.78 After a mass shooting in Hungerford, England, in 1987, Parliament banned most semiautomatic rifles; and
then following a shooting at an elementary school in Dunblane, Scotland, in
1996, Parliament effectively prohibited private ownership of handguns.79
Although firearms are tightly regulated and certain sorts are banned
from private ownership, guns in Britain are not completely prohibited: there
are still 1.3 million licensed shotguns in the United Kingdom and over
500,000 other legally licensed firearms.80 Despite that vestigial interest in
guns among some Britons, there is seemingly little popular support for loosening gun laws. After the only post-Dunblane mass shooting in the United
Kingdom—in Cumbria, England, in 201081—polling revealed that a third of
Britons supported a complete ban on civilian gun ownership, with another
third supporting tightening existing restrictions, and only four percent supporting a relaxation of the gun laws.82
76 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 165–70.
77 See id. at 170–75.
78 See id. at 175. For a description of contemporary British gun control regulation, see
Dominic Casciani, Gun Control and Ownership Laws in the UK, BBC (Nov. 2, 2010), http://
www.bbc.com/news/10220974.
79 See Casciani, supra note 78; Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Great Britain, LIBR.
OF
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/greatbritain.php (last
updated July 30, 2015).
80 There Are More Licensed Gun Owners in the UK than You Might Think, ECON. (Oct. 19,
2017), https://www.ecnmy.org/engage/the-uk-has-more-licensed-gun-owners-than-youmight-think/.
81 Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Great Britain, supra note 79. The Cumbria
shooting resulted in no major change to British gun laws. Id.
82 Ban on Guns?, YOUGOV (June 7, 2010), https://yougov.co.uk/news/2010/06/07/
Ban-on-guns/. Those results are generally consistent with a Gallup poll from 2005, which
showed that seventy-nine percent of British adults wanted stricter gun laws compared to
only five percent who wanted laxer laws. See Shelley Mika, Britons Aim for Tougher Gun
Laws, GALLUP (June 21, 2005), http://news.gallup.com/poll/16990/britons-aim-toughergun-laws.aspx. While Britons seem content with severe restrictions on civilian gun possession, a poll from last year indicated that seventy-two percent support routinely arming
police officers with guns. See Harry Carr, Sky Poll: Most Britons Want Police to be Armed, SKY
NEWS (June 5, 2017), https://news.sky.com/story/sky-poll-three-in-four-support-arminguk-police-after-terror-attacks-10905554.
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But as the English right to “have” arms declined in the face of increasing
Parliamentary restrictions in Britain, the right simultaneously inspired a
robust understanding of the American right to “keep and bear” arms. As
Justice Scalia explained for the Supreme Court in the Heller decision, the
meaning of the Second Amendment must be informed by its “historical background . . . because it has always been widely understood that the Second
Amendment . . . codified a pre-existing right.”83 As the Court’s opinion
explained, “[t]he very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes
the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it ‘shall not be
infringed.’”84 The Heller Court also quoted favorably an 1876 Supreme
Court opinion that observed that the Second Amendment right “is not a
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
upon that instrument for its existence.”85
Although the Second Amendment may have formally bound the new
American government as a matter of positive law, those passages in Heller
reflect the view of Enlightenment liberal thinkers like Locke and Blackstone
that natural rights preexist government. Based on those passages and the
Court’s quotation of subsequent American judicial opinions speaking of a
“natural right” of self-defense, one scholar has observed that “[o]ne of the
most important elements of the . . . Heller decision is the natural law.”86 Professor Hadley Arkes, a constitutional theorist who advocates using natural law
to inform constitutional interpretation, has even suggested that the Heller
opinion reflects Justice Scalia’s flirtation with a natural law perspective, even
though the Justice was, in general, “famously dubious”—as Arkes puts it—
about natural law theory as a mode of constitutional interpretation.87
In any event, whether influenced solely by the positive law theory of
originalism, or also inspired by a natural law view, our Supreme Court—after
reviewing the English history I have laid out in this lecture88—concluded
that “the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the
83 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)).
86 Kopel, supra note 4, at 235–39. For a pre-Heller view on the importance of naturalrights considerations on the Second Amendment, which reaches a contrary conclusion to
Heller, see Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
237, 283 (2000).
87 See Hadley Arkes, Scalia and the Lure of the Natural Law, FIRST THINGS (July 1, 2008),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2008/07/scalia-and-the-lure-of-the-nat; see
also Hadley Arkes, A Natural Law Manifesto, JAMES WILSON INST. ON NAT. RTS. & AM. FOUNDING, https://jameswilsoninstitute.org/about/a-natural-law-manifesto (criticizing Justice
Scalia’s tentative positive law view that history only informed the Second Amendment
based on original public understanding and the fact that “Blackstone and James Wilson
invoked that right of self-preservation, and that many people read them at the time”).
88 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–95.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL108.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 15

26-NOV-19

english origin of the right to keep and bear arms

8:44

411

time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against
both public and private violence.”89
C
But although Heller answered that question and determined that a total
prohibition on having handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment, it left open many other questions about the scope of the Second
Amendment right.90 Many of those issues have since been confronted by the
courts of appeals, such as whether and to what extent does the right to keep
and to bear arms extend beyond the home,91 what types of criminal convictions justify subsequent disarming,92 and whether special locations justify
heightened gun regulation.93
The influence of English history on the Second Amendment’s ratifying
generation may inform the answers to these and other questions. For example, our courts have divided on the question of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry arms publicly, with judges on the one hand
citing Blackstone and seventeenth-century English caselaw to hold that the
English right included a right to carry publicly,94 and on the other hand
invoking the fourteenth-century Statute of Northampton restricting the carrying of arms to hold that English law recognized significant limitations on
the public carry of firearms.95 Pre-1791 history may also provide insights into
whom the Second Amendment’s ratifiers would have considered sufficiently
dangerous to disarm, or what types of weapons they would have thought
received protection.
The value of history in American courts will depend on the question
being asked. To the extent an issue about the parameters of the Second
Amendment is one that colonial-era Anglo-American law confronted, such
historical experience will help judges discern the understanding of the American public of 1791. But not all questions will have such an ancient pedigree,
and we will have to apply modes of analysis beyond historical analogy to
answer them.
89 Id. at 594.
90 See id. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts
routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever
in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. . . . [W]e do not undertake an
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment . . . .”).
91 E.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Peruta v.
City of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
92 E.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
93 E.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 473 (4th Cir. 2011).
94 See, e.g., Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659–61.
95 See, e.g., Peruta, 824 F.3d at 929–32.
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VIII
To conclude, the English history of the right to have arms has proved
critical to the contemporary Supreme Court in interpreting the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. There are of course differences—for
instance, the Second Amendment shed the English right’s limitations based
on social class and creed—but the core right is indeed a transplant from
across the Atlantic. So, for good or ill, depending on your point of view,
Americans have the Englishmen who won the Glorious Revolution and the
Whigs who later championed a muscular Bill of Rights to thank (or to blame)
for the American right to keep and bear arms.
Thank you.

